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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
DALE S. PIERRE/ 
Defendant-Appellant 
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE 
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal proceeding brought by the State of 
Utah against Dale S. Pierre, Defendant-Appellant, charging him 
with three counts of murder in the first degree in violation of 
Section 76-5-202, Utah Code Annotated (1953) , and two counts of 
aggravated robbery in violation of Section 76-6-302, Utah Code 
Annotated (1973 Supp.). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Defendant-Appellant was found guilty of three 
counts of first-degree murder and two counts of aggravated rob-
bery in the District Court of the Second Judicial District in 
and for Davis County, Utah, on November 15, 1974. The jury 
Case No. 13903 
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recommended after a hearing that the Defendant be sentenced to 
death on all three counts of first-degree murder on November 20, 
1974. On Noyember 27, 1974, the Honorable John F. Wahlquist 
sentenced the Defendant to death by shooting on all three counts 
of first-degree murder and further sentenced the defendant to an 
indeterminate term of not less than five years to life imprison-
ment in the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Defendant-Appellant seeks an order of this Court 
reversing the judgment rendered at trial and hearing on the 
sentence of this cause, and a ruling remanding the cause to the 
trial court for a new trial, or in the alternative, an order 
setting aside the sentence of death and remanding the case to 
the trial court for the imposition of the sentence of life 
imprisonment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Amicus stipulates to the facts as stated in the brief 
of Respondent in this appeal, which clearly and graphically 
depict the Defendant's brutal, savage, and senseless slaughter 
of three human beings after subjecting them, and two others, to 
an agonizing torture. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT MUST CONSIDER PUBLIC STANDARDS OF DECENCY 
IN DECIDING UPON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE PUBLIC 
UNQUESTIONABLY FAVORS CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. 
Both the United States Constitution and the Consti-
tution of the State of Utah prohibit the infliction of "cruel 
and unusual punishments" (U. S. Constitution, Amendment 8; 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 9). 
In Weems v. U. S,, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), the United 
States Supreme Court rejected a static interpretation of this 
"cruel and unusual" language when it recognized that "time . . . 
brings into existence new conditions and purposes," and the 
interpretation of what constitutes cruel and unusual punish-
ment may change as "public opinion becomes enlightened by a 
human justice" (217 U.S. at 378). Later, in Trop v. Dulles, 
356 U.S. 86 (1958), the U. S. Supreme Court reaffirmed this 
position when it asserted that the Eighth Amendment derived 
its meaning from the "evolving standards of decency that mark 
progress of a maturing society" (356 U.S. at 101). 
In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), six 
Justices accepted the proposition that the definition of what 
is cruel and unusual punishment changes in accordance with 
public opinion prevalent at that time (408 U.S. at 242 [Douglas, 
J., concurring]; Id. at 264 [Brennan, J., concurring]; Id. 
at 329 [Marshall, J., concurring]; Id. at 382-3 [Burger, C. 
J., dissenting]; Id. at 409 [Blackmun, J., dissenting]; Id. 
at 429-30 [Powell, J., dissenting]. These Justices expressed 
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sharp disagreement, however, on the questions of where the 
public stands on the issue of capital punishment, whether 
opinion polls are valid indicators of public sentiment about 
capital punishment, and the extent to which enlightened public 
opinion determines contemporary standards of decency. 
Public opinion polls are universally accepted as an 
accurate indicator of the public sentiment in most, but not all, 
cases. This is clearly shown in this presidential election 
year by comparing - the actual returns with the projected voter 
response based on a public opinion poll. But even in the con-
stantly changing world of presidential politics, the polls 
are seldom wrong; and even when they are wrong as to who the 
winner will be, they are not far wrong. Public opinion polls, 
although not infallible, are a proper starting point for deter-
mining how the public feels on the issue of capital punishment. 
The very nature of capital punishment forces legal 
scholars to consider things well outside the realm of legal 
theory and legal precedents. As previously noted, judges have 
long attempted to decide such issues on the basis of the 
nation's "standards of decency." So, with the assumption that 
public opinion polls are, at the very least, a helpful start-
ing point in measuring public sentiment, we will discuss the 
results of some recent polls. 
Studies have been made on the results of all of the 
public opinion polls done in this century. (See "Public Opinion 
and the Death Penalty," Vidmar and Ellsworth, 26 Stanford Law 
Review 1245,.1275 [June, 1974].) According to these studies, 
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public support for the death penalty declined at a fairly con-
sistent rate until 1966. Gallup polls indicated that 62 percent 
of the people were in favor of capital punishment in 1936 but 
that this number had declined to 42 percent by 1966. 
After 1966, however, this trend has reversed; and by 
1969, 51 percent of the American public supported the death 
penalty. Nationwide polls conducted subsequent to 1969 show 
that this upward trend has continued. In 1973, 57 percent 
favored capital punishment (Gallup Opinion Index, March, 1973). 
The most recent poll taken indicated that a strong 
64 percent of the nation now favors capital punishment. It is 
interesting to note that no area of the country fell below 63 
percent in favoring the death penalty. Further, every cate-
gory of persons--sex, race, income, religion, political affili-
ation, occupation, and population, both urban and rural-<-dearly 
favored capital punishment. Some of these groups favored the 
death penalty by as much as a 70^-percent .ratio (see Gallup 
Opinion Index, November, 1974) , 
Opponents of the validity of public opinion polls 
generally base their criticisms on cases where the poll showed 
one candidate winning a close election race while, in fact, 
that candidate lost in a close decision. This is a quibbling 
over a few percentage points1 variance either way. Few, how-
ever, could dispute the validity of these public opinion polls 
taken on the issue of capital punishment. Because of the 
strong majority-^64 percent nationwide-r-it would be correct 
to say that the American public has indicated in no uncertain 
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terms that capital punishment is a valid method in combatting 
crime in the United States, 
Public opinion in favor of capital punishment has 
not been limited to public opinion polls, however. Since 
Furman v. Georgia, state legislatures in approximately one 
half of the states have re-enacted capital punishment statutes 
(see Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Defendant-Respondent, 
pp. 22-25).. Furman had effectively voided the death sentences 
of 631 persons on death row in 32 states (see M. Meltsner, 
Cruel & Unusual Punishment, pp. 292-93 [1973]). 
Finally, in the face of a California Supreme Court 
decision holding the death penalty unconstitutional, People v. 
Anderson, 403 P,2d 880, cert. den. 406 U.S. 958 (1972), the 
people of California approved an amendment to the state consti-
tution calling for reinstatement of the death penalty in Novem-
ber, 1972, by an overwhelming two-to-one majority (see "Death— 
California Style," 3 San Fernando Valley Law Review, 145, 153). 
The result of this amendment was a revised codification of 
California's capital punishment statute. 
The California vote indicated that approximately 
67 percent of its citizens favored the death penalty. It is 
interesting to note that this figure is slightly higher than 
the figure reached by the Gallup Poll mentioned previously 
herein. If anything, this vote is hard evidence supporting 
the validity of the 63 percent figure reached by Gallup!s 
pollsters. 
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While the people of Utah have not had the opportunity 
to vote on the issue of capital punishment, this Court has 
upheld the constitutionality of the Utah statute now under 
attack in this case. In State v. Winkle, 528 P.2d 467 (1974), 
the Court upheld the statute further, voting that the Furman 
decision has created great confusion in legal circles through-
out the nation. This decision, in light of the public opinion 
polls, supports the assertion that Utah's citizenry is strongly 
in favor of capital punishment. 
In most cases, public opinion would have little 
bearing on a court's decision in any particular case. Public 
opinion cannot change the legal issues to be considered. Here, 
however, in view of the previously voted pronouncements by the 
U. S. Supreme Court that public opinion is of utmost and fore-
most importance in the determination of a capital punishment 
issue, public opinion must be considered by the Court. Clearly, 
as evidenced by national opinion polls and Utah's judicial 
declaration of the constitutionality of its capital punishment 
statute, Utah's people and its courts favor capital punishment. 
On this basis, this Court must once again decide this issue in 
favor of capital punishment. 
II. UTAH'S LEGISLATURE CAN REASONABLY DETERMINE THAT THE 
PROTECTION OF SOCIETY UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS REQUIRES 
DEATH AS A FORM OF PUNISHMENT FOR SERIOUS OFFENSES. 
Americans live in constant fear for their lives and 
their property in today's society. A recent Gallup poll 
indicated that 45 percent of Americans are afraid to walk in 
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their neighborhood at night. Further, 19 percent do not feel 
safe and secure in their own homes at night. It is significant 
to note that 57 percent of the nonwhites polled were afraid to 
walk in their neighborhood at night, an increase of 9 percent 
since 1972. Overall, one out of every eight Americans is both 
afraid to walk in his neighborhood at night and insecure behind 
the doors of his/her home (see Gallup Poll Index, November, 1975). 
In light of these figures, it is not surprising that 
21 percent of the large city residents polled and 15 percent of 
the nation as a whole viewed crime as the top problem facing 
their communities today. With the present economic situation, 
it is significant that crime was felt to be a bigger problem 
than inflation and recession. As late as 1949, only 4 percent 
of the American public felt that crime was the number one pro-
blem in America (see Gallup Poll Index, November, 1975) . 
The prominence given crime in the public's list of 
top local problems is by no means limited to the views of 
residents of the largest cities. Even in medium and small 
cities, crime is seen as the number one community problem. 
There seems to be little hope of these figures 
improving. One half of the people polled felt that there was 
more crime in their area than there was twelve months before 
that date. Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics prove 
that these people were correct in their feelings. 
All crimes increased 9 percent and violent crimes 
increased 5 percent from 1974 to 1975, In the western states, 
murder increased by 9 percent during that same period. This 
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continues a trend that has been evident for several years as 
shown by. the following table: 
To 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 " 
1975 
From 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
Total 
Crime 
+ 10% 
+ 9 
+ 6 
- 4 
+ 6 
+ 18 
+ 9 
* Violent 
Crime 
+ 11% 
+ 12 
+ 11 
+ 2 
+ 5 
+ 11 
+ 5 
-
Murder 
+ 7 
+ 8 
+ 11 
+ 5 
+ 5 
+ 6 
- 1 
In 1974, a murder occurred in the United States every 26 
minutes and .a violent crime occurred every 33 seconds (see 
FBI, Uniform Crime Reports, March 25, 1976). 
The basis for the FBI statistics is their "total 
crime index," which is a figure indicating the number of 
crimes committed within a particular area. In Utah, this 
total crime index increased by 18.2 percent from 1973 to 1974, 
and the violent crime index increased by 4.4 percent during 
that time period. Statistics are not yet available for 1974 
to 1975 or 1975 to 1976 for Utah. 
In an attempt to correct this bleak picture, Utah's 
legislature has enacted the present capital punishment statute 
now being challenged in this Court (see Utah Code Annotated, 
§76-3-206, 207 [1973 Supp.]). We contend that the death 
penalty serves a vital purpose in the punishment structure of 
society and that this is a matter upon which the legislature 
of this state should make the determination. 
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The showing as to the social utility of capital 
punishment should be addressed to the legislative body; and 
the burden, if any, which must be assumed in the judicial 
setting, is only to demonstrate that there is, in fact, a 
basis upon which the legislature of this state could reason-
ably conclude that certain serious offenses should be punished 
by death. It is a settled doctrine of constitutional law that 
the burden of proof is on the one who challenges the constitu-
tionality of a statute and that in the absence of a clear 
showing of unconstitutionality a state statute will be presumed 
valid (McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 [1961]). 
The basic elements commonly ascribed as the pur-
poses of punishment may be reduced to four: (1) deterrence, 
(2) incapacitation or isolation, (3) rehabilitation, and 
(4) retribution. 
As to rehabilitation, it is obvious that as to the 
serious criminal offender deemed not capable of rehabilita-
tion and sentenced to death, this purpose of punishment is not 
viable. In recent years, at least as to the nonviolent offen-
der, rehabilitation was considered the progressive goal of 
punishment. However, recent studies have cast much doubt on 
the effectiveness of rehabilitation in the penal system. 
Indeed, lack of rehabilitation in the penal system was most 
probably a basis for the enactment of the habitual offender 
statutes (see Utah Code Annotated, §76-8-1001, 1002 [1973 
Supp.]). 
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As to retribution, while it may not now be recognized 
as a major objective in our system of punishment, as Lord 
Justice Denning said: 
The punishment inflicted for grave crimes should 
adequately reflect the revulsion felt by the great 
majority of citizens for them. It is a mistake to 
consider the objectives of punishment as being 
deterrent or .reformative or preventive and nothing 
else . . . The ultimate justification of any 
punishment is . . . that it is the emphatic denun-
ciation by the community of a crime; and . . . 
there are some murders which . . . demand the 
most emphatic denunication of all, namely the 
death penalty. 
(Quoted in National Commission on Reform of 
Federal Criminal Laws, 2 Working Papers 1359 
[n. 47] [1970]) 
And as Justice Stewart said in his concurring opinion 
in Furman v. Georgia, supra at 308: 
On that score I would say only that 'I cannot 
agree that retribution is a constitutionally 
impermissible ingredient in the imposition of 
punishment. The instinct for retribution is part 
of the nature of man, and channeling"that instinct 
in the administration of criminal justice serves 
an important purpose in promoting the stability 
of a society governed by law. When people begin 
to believe that organized society is unwilling or 
unable to impose upon criminal offenders the 
punishment they "deserve," then there are sown 
the seeds of anarchy <-~of self-help, vigilante 
justice and lynch of law. 
One commentator, in discussing the retributive 
theory of punishment, said that those who ignore this facet 
of punishment are only evidencing sentimental foolishness, 
that if the natural desire for vengeance is not met and satis-
fied by the orderly procedure of the criminal law there is 
danger of reversion to the bloody vengeance of feud and 
vendetta. He also noted that rather than calling this urge 
of human nature to be a "passion for revenge" it could, with 
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equal aptness, be termed the "passion for justice" (Morris R. 
Cohen, "Moral Aspects of Criminal Law," 49 Yale Law Journal 
987 at 1011-12).
 m t 
One purpose of punishment is isolation or incapaci-
tation. Life imprisonment often provides a woefully inadequate 
method of protecting society through incapacitation or isola-
tion of the offender* In Utah, the Board of Pardons has 
absolute discretion regarding when to parole a prisoner (Utah 
Code Annotated, §76-3-202 [1973 Supp.]). In cases such as this 
where the Defendant has been convicted of first-degree murder, 
the prisoner must serve only 15 years of the life-imprisonment 
sentence. The myth that paroled or incarcerated murderers do 
not kill again evaporates very readily upon perusal of case 
reports throughout the nation. 
It must be noted that the armed robber or armed 
burglar commonly faced with a maximum term of life imprison-
ment if apprehended might well consider himself foolish not to 
kill his victim or a witness if in doing so he would risk only 
the same penalty—life imprisonment for murder—while increas-
ing multifold his chances of avoiding apprehension. The armed 
robber of the one-man liquor store would not let the petitioners1 
views of the dignity of human life cause him to hesitate for a 
moment in killing the lonely figure behind the counter at a 
late hour when there are no other persons around to witness 
such an execution. The same applies to the willingness of the 
armed robber to kill a police officer to avoid apprehension and 
conviction, when without the death penalty the criminal will 
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risk no added punishment if he does away with his intended 
captor. This would also be true of the "lifer" in a correc-
tional facility who is faced with only another life sentence 
for taking the life of a guard in prison. Such a sentence 
would not only be futile, but would make a mockery of our 
system of justice. 
Some studies have concluded that the death penalty 
exerts no discernible influence on the rate of homicides. It 
is evident that these statistical studies were "fatally flawed" 
in the failure to hold constant other factors besides punish-
ment that might influence the murder rate (see generally Posner, 
"The Economic Approach to Law," 53 Texas Law Review 757, 766-
68 [1975]). In fact, at least one study has concluded that 
when capital punishment was actually used a significant number 
of lives were saved (Ehrlich, "The Deterrent Effect of Capital 
Punishment: A Question of Life and Death," 75 American 
Economic Review 397 [June, 1975]). 
The existence of so many influential factors not 
susceptible of measurement and correlation would impugn the 
-statistical methodology of the studies concluding that capital 
punishment has no deterrent effect. Clearly, the existence 
of these variables precludes a meaningful comparison between 
general undifferentiated murder statistics and a single pro-
posed causal factor—that of the existence of the death penalty 
in a particular jurisdiction. 
Secondly, the steady increase of homicides across 
the nation, presumably caused by social and economic factors, 
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naturally tends to cover up the perceptible deterrent effects 
of the death penalty which might appear in the antiseptic con-
ditions of the social laboratory.
 t 
A third objection to this statistical approach is 
that it measures the homicide rate in terms of the theoretical 
existence of the death penalty, that is, the existing statutes 
and judgments imposing the punishment of death, rather than in 
terms of the actual existence of the death penalty, that is, 
the executions carried out. During the previous decade in 
which the dramatic increases in murders were recorded, while 
juries continued at a relatively stable rate to fix the penalty 
of death in the appropriate cases, the annual executions in 
the United States dwindled to nothing. The period from 1968 
through 1973 showed that the number of offenses of murder 
increased 42 percent and that the rate per hundred thousand 
inhabitants was up 35 percent (FBI, Uniform Crime Reports, 
1973 [September 6, 1974] at 6-7). 
U. S. Justice Marshall observed in Powell v. Texas, 
392 U.S. 514 at 531 (1968), with general reference to the 
deterrent effect of criminal sanctions, 
. . . The long-standing and still raging debate 
over the validity of the deterrence justification 
for penal sanctions has not reached any suffi-
ciently clear conclusions to permit it to be said 
that such sanctions are ineffective in any parti-
cular context or for any particular group of people 
who are able to appreciate the consequences of 
their acts. 
We submit that this foregoing statement has equal 
validity when applied specifically to the deterrent effect of 
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the death penalty. It would appear to be a fact that to the 
rational person the threat of the greater punishment has a 
greater deterrent effect (see Royal Commission on Capital 
Punishment Report, 1949-1953 at p. 24, Section 68 [1953]). 
The United States Supreme Court has also recognized 
the deterrent effect of capital punishment (see Brady v. U. S., 
397 U.S.. 742, 775 [1970]; U. S. v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 
[1968]). 
We submit that the Utah State Legislature can also 
conclude that the existence of the death penalty for certain 
heinous crimes might cause some potential murderers to be so 
gripped by fear that they would be deterred from criminal 
endeavors and would refrain from the firing of a gun at the , 
lonely gas station attendant standing in a gas station or the 
police officer attempting to effect an arrest. As the "Joint 
Report" of the Legislative Committee on Capital Punishment of 
Pennsylvania said: "The plain fact is that it can never be 
known how many persons are actually deterred by threat of 
punishment whether capital or otherwise." It is also said that 
if capital punishment is so unique, so abhorrent, and so fear-
some it seems inconceivable that a rational person trying to 
decide whether to commit a capital crime would ignore the 
potential penalty of death. The innocent life saved when the 
potential murderer is "so gripped by fearfl of the death penalty 
as to hold his fire and refrain from taking someone's life is 
not reflected in the statistics surveyed by the social scien-
tists. 
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The fact that the death penalty does not deter all 
is no reason for rejecting this form of punishment. The 
statistics, to which earlier reference has been made, lump the 
undeterrable murderers with those that possibly could have 
been deterred. Studies of murder rates and their relation-
ship to the death .penalty would be valid only if they were 
limited to deterrable homicides involving a course of conduct 
understandingly embarked upon such as armed robbery, collec-
tion of insurance on the victim's life, kidnapping for ransom, 
etc. 
The position of the person who must deal face to 
face with homicidal offenders—law enforcement officers^— 
understandably takes a position in favor of the death penalty. 
The late J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI, stated his 
unqualified objection to the abolition of capital punishment 
as follows: 
The professional law enforcement officer is 
convinced from experience that the hardened criminal 
has been and is deterred from killing based on the 
prospect of the death penalty . . . . For the law 
enforcement officer the time-proven deterrents to 
crime are sure detection, swift apprehension, and 
proper punishment. Each is a necessary ingredient. 
(FBI, Uniform Crime Reports, 1959 issue) 
In conclusion, it is submitted that there has been 
no clear showing that the death penalty serves no legitimate 
function in our society. The U. S. Constitution and the Consti-
tution of the State of Utah give to the legislature, the elected 
representatives of the people, the right to determine that the 
protection of society under present conditions requires death as 
a form of punishment for certain serious crimes. 
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CONCLUSION 
The will of the people has clearly been shown to 
favor the existence of capital punitehment in Utah. In an era 
characterized by rising crime rates, mass killings, inmate 
homicides, revolutionary bombings of public buildings, and the 
assassination of public figures and law enforcement officers, 
it would be inappropriate for a legislature to contravene the 
will of society by abolishing capital punishment. How much 
less appropriate would it be for this Court to decree that 
this form of punishment, sanctioned by the history of our 
state and nation, is now forbidden to the people? A society 
designed to protect its innocent members from savage and 
senseless acts demands that it be allowed to use all available 
methods to afford this protection to its citizenry. 
Capital punishment is a viable and effective tool 
in the never-ending war against crime. To abolish such a 
tool would undoubtedly do substantial harm to the welfare of 
Utah residents. 
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